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Abstract 
 
Although there is still no consensus on the causes of large differences in income per capita across 
countries, a growing literature considers culturally-based beliefs and institutions as main drivers of the 
latter differences (Guiso et al. 2006; Tabellini 2010). The intuition is that institutions and beliefs affect the 
incentive to accumulate human and physical capital. Other strands of literature stress that the supply of 
entrepreneurship is a fundamental ingredient of economic growth and job creation. In this paper, we argue 
that the two views should be reconciled on the basis of the following arguments: a) occupational choices 
and the decision to accumulate human capital are affected by cultural and institutional factors; b) 
occupational choices are the main tool to allocate human capital within societies; c) entrepreneurs govern 
the allocation of resources in the economy, including the human resources.   
Confirming our hypothesis, our empirical analysis show that cultural factors matter and fatalism exerts a 
particularly negative effect on opportunity perception and on opportunity driven entrepreneurship.  For 
what regards institutional variables,  three interesting and somehow non conventional results emerge from 
the analysis. First, low start-up cost are particular favorable for necessity driven entrepreneurship but not 
for the opportunity driven ones. Second, labor market flexibility yields a lower probability of being an 
entrepreneur  and this results holds for both necessity and opportunity driven entrepreneurs. Third, the 
more burdensome the administrative requirement (permits, regulations, reporting) in entrepreneurial 
activity, the lower the probability of being an opportunity driven entrepreneur. 
On the whole, our results yield some policy relevant implications: a) culturally-based beliefs matter for 
entrepreneurship and fatalism is more important than trust in others;  b) education can affect people’s 
fatalism; c) entrepreneurial education can be an important tool for fostering good quality 
entrepreneurship, i.e. opportunity driven entrepreneurship; c) institutions matter for entrepreneurship 
and growth but, somehow, in unconventional ways. 
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1. Introduction 
Although there is still no consensus on the causes of large differences in income per capita 
across countries, a growing literature considers culturally-based beliefs and institutions as 
main drivers of the latter differences (Guiso et al. 2006; Tabellini 2010). The intuition is 
that institutions and beliefs affect the incentive to accumulate human and physical capital. 
Other strands of literature stress that the supply of entrepreneurship is a fundamental 
ingredient of economic growth and job creation. In this paper, we argue that the two views 
should be reconciled on the basis of the following arguments: a) occupational choices and 
the decision to accumulate human capital are affected by cultural and institutional factors; 
b) occupational choices are the main tool to allocate human capital within societies; c) 
entrepreneurs govern the allocation of resources in the economy, including the human 
resources.   
We start with a simple question: what determines occupational choices in different 
countries, namely, in countries differing for their culture and institutions? Two 
intrinsically related questions are: what determines the quality of entrepreneurship in 
different countries and how can we measure it? 
Our line of reasoning is the following. Occupational choices are based on people’s 
expectations about the value of different options. The self-assessment of one's skills, 
business and job opportunities and, eventually, of well being deriving from different 
occupational choices, ceteris paribus, is shaped by people’s psychological traits and by 
their culturally-based prior beliefs and the impact of different psychological and cultural 
traits is uneven across occupations. For instance, the value of being self-employed will be 
more responsive to self-confidence than the value of being an employee. Overconfident 
individuals may attach a higher value to their skills/opportunities in self-employment than 
less confident individuals. Since they feel better suited to govern life events, individuals 
characterised by an internal locus of control will attach a higher value to market 
opportunities relative to individuals with an external locus of control.  One should expect 
that the same uneven impact across occupations is exerted by cultural beliefs and, among 
them, by people’s trust in others and people’s fatalism, i.e. people’s propensity to believe 
that their destinies are ruled by an unseen power – Fate – rather than by their will. Of 
course, entrepreneurs should be more involved in market transactions, whose expected 
value depends on trust in others, than employees;  moreover, expectations about the link 
between actions and results should affect more the value of being entrepreneurs than the 
value of being employees.  
This is not the end of the story. Culturally-based beliefs and personality traits 
interact with the institutional setting in determining the returns to different occupational 
choices. In particular, entrepreneurial opportunities are shaped by formal and informal 
institutions, e.g. product market regulation, labour market regulation. Hence,  both 
culturally-based beliefs and institutions determine which individuals become 
entrepreneurs,  their performance as entrepreneurs and the interaction between personal 
characteristics and institutions may generate unexpected outcomes3. This is confirmed by 
                                               
3 “[…]holding that entrepreneurs are always with us and always play some substantial role.[….] How the 
entrepreneurs act at a given time and place depends heavily on the rules of the game –the reward 
structure of the economy- that happen to prevail. Thus the central hypothesis here is that it is the set of 
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data suggesting that the prevailing economic, political, and legal institutions affect both the 
numbers of individuals who choose to become entrepreneurs (Torrini, 2005) and their 
characteristics (Blanchflower and Oswald, 1998). However, which culturally-based beliefs 
and institutions matter? Furthermore, how does the latter shape entrepreneurial selection 
and determine entrepreneurial quality and performance?  
Building on these premises, our research aim is to assess how institutions and 
culturally-based beliefs affect occupational choices and entrepreneurship across countries. 
We distinguish different notions of entrepreneurship (i.e. self-employed and entrepreneurs 
strictu sensu, opportunity driven entrepreneurs and out of necessity entrepreneurs) and 
we separate psychological traits from cultural beliefs.  
Confirming our hypothesis, cultural factors matter and fatalism exerts a particularly 
negative effect on opportunity perception and on opportunity driven entrepreneurship.  
For what regards institutional variables,  three interesting and somehow non conventional 
results emerge from the analysis. First, low start-up cost are particular favorable for 
necessity driven entrepreneurship but not for the opportunity driven ones. Second, labor 
market flexibility yields a lower probability of being an entrepreneur  and this results holds 
for both necessity and opportunity driven entrepreneurs. Third, the more burdensome the 
administrative requirement (permits, regulations, reporting) in entrepreneurial activity, 
the lower the probability of being an opportunity driven entrepreneur. 
On the whole, our results yield some policy relevant implications: a) culturally-
based beliefs matter for entrepreneurship and fatalism is more important than trust in 
others;  b) education can affect people’s fatalism; c) entrepreneurial education can be an 
important tool for fostering good quality entrepreneurship, i.e. opportunity driven 
entrepreneurship; c) institutions matter for entrepreneurship and growth but, somehow, 
in unconventional ways. 
 The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the role of cultural beliefs and 
institutions in occupational choices and entrepreneurship. Section 3 illustrates the 
empirical strategy and results. Section 4 sketches the main conclusions.  
 
2. Culture, institutions and entrepreneurship 
The concept of culture and culturally-based prior beliefs is too broad for empirical 
investigation. Hence, the first step is to identify culture and prior beliefs in a sufficiently 
narrow way, so that it become possible to investigate the causal link from prior beliefs to 
occupational choices: building on Guiso et al. (2006, p. 23), “we define culture as those 
customary beliefs and values that ethnic, religious, and social groups transmit fairly 
unchanged from generation to generation.”; in addition, for our practical purposes, the 
latter customary beliefs must have a relevant impact on economic choices4.  
                                                                                                                                                            
rules and not the supply of entrepreneurs or the nature of their objectives that undergoes significant 
changes from one period to another and helps to dictate the ultimate effect on the economy via the 
allocation of entrepreneurial resources” (Baumol, 1990 p. 894). Hence, according to Baumol, the 
institutional setting and its functioning determine the prevalent entrepreneurial model. 
4 Another well known definition of culture has been proposed by Hofstede (1991): «the collective 
programming of the mind which distinguishes the members of one group or category of people from 
another » (1991,p.5).  These two definitions allow to highlight the salient characteristics of culture. Culture is 
is not directly visible but manifested through behaviors, is a collective not individual attribute, and  is slow 
moving being an inheritance that fathers  leave to sons.  In  particular  according to Hofstede,  being “a 
mental program”  culture is not tangible and largely unobservable as it can only be studied through various 
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The distinction between psychological or personality traits and culturally-based 
prior beliefs is not neat5. Indeed, it is not a scope of this paper to discuss the ample 
literature in psychology and anthropology on the subject: building on latter contributions, 
our contention is that cultural beliefs pertain to the social sphere, i.e. cultural beliefs are a 
social construct, whereas psychological traits belong the individual sphere (Church, 2000). 
As long as the set of psychological traits and culturally-based prior beliefs are comparable 
across countries6, individuals should be characterized through two sets of idiosyncratic 
elements: personality traits and prior beliefs. As such, the latter distinction is relevant to 
the analysis of occupational choices on both empirical and policy grounds. 
Whereas the connections between trust, institutions and economic outcomes has 
been widely investigated, the role of fatalism, in spite of its importance, is still omitted. It is 
surprising that a cultural trait so important in characterizing expectations about the link 
between actions and results has received so scarce attention in economics, in particular, in 
the context of the analysis of entrepreneurship. Although the actual meaning of the word 
fatalism changes slightly across cultures and religions, it can be linked with people’s 
propensity to believe that their destiny is ruled by unseen powers, the Fate, rather than by 
their will. Indeed, the concept of locus of control, developed in psychology, is akin to the 
concept of fatalism: in fact, moving from an internal to an external locus of control, 
inevitably implies an increasingly fatalistic view of life.  People’s self-confidence, optimism 
and locus of control are all characteristics connected to culturally-based beliefs like 
people’s trust and fatalism (Church, 2000). So, contributions based on those concepts are 
the natural starting point for our analysis.  Still, we think that the distinction should be 
maintained between personality traits, belonging to the psychological sphere, and those 
traits confined to the cultural sphere.  
Building on Harper (1998, 2003) and Ruiu (2012) we maintain that fatalism,  
undermining the perceived link between efforts and outcomes, may induce individuals to 
believe that  the discovering of  good business opportunities is much more a matter of luck 
rather than the outcome of  a costly search effort. These beliefs may induce high ability 
individuals (those with a high reservation wage) to prefer wage-earning to 
entrepreneurship. However, this result  doesn’t rule out the existence of ‘out of necessity’ 
entrepreneurs, i.e. low ability owners of low productivity firms, who have decided to 
pursue an entrepreneurial career because they lacked good income generating alternatives. 
The perverse effect of fatalism on potential high ability entrepreneurs is that it may induce 
them to become employees or to choose self employment activities either very regulated or 
characterized by a low entrepreneurial content, such as being lawyers or consultants, thus 
undermining the innovative capacity of a country and then its growth potential.  
                                                                                                                                                            
verbal and nonverbal manifestations values, heroes, rituals, and symbols which influence behaviors. Values 
are the core of the definition of culture and represent the most deeply embedded manifestation of culture. 
According to Hofstede (1980,p.18) a value can be defined as: « a broad tendency to prefer certain state of 
affairs over others».  The values shape the identity of group of individuals or more generally of countries and 
thus cultures can be compared with each other using values as a standard. Furthermore,  this characteristic 
of culture is fundamental to distinguish this concept from the concept of  personality.  
5 There is an ongoing debate among psychologists to what extent culture and personality can be considered 
independent and distinct variables, and to what extent they are mutually constitutive. 
6 The Big Five (Extraversion, Agreeableness, Conscientiousness, Emotional Stability vs. Neuroticism, 
Openness to Experience or Intellect)  are an example of stable across culture traits.  
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Entrepreneurship may be influenced by culture both directly (through values, prior 
beliefs, etc) )  and indirectly (through its relation with institutions). For what regards the 
direct channel, there is increasing  empirical evidence  showing that cultural beliefs  and 
values are important determinants of entrepreneurial choices. According to Guiso, 
Sapienza and Zingales (2006) culture can influence occupational choice through its 
influence on preferences  and prior beliefs. In particular, they argue that  entrepreneurial 
activity entails being often involved in economic transactions with unknown counterparts. 
This means that individuals who are more willing to trust others may have a comparative 
advantage in becoming entrepreneurs.  Using WVS data they show that trust is at least 
partly culturally determined (in particular it is influenced by religious beliefs) and since 
whether an individual expresses trust is highly correlated with whether that individual is 
trustworthy (Glaeser et. al., 2000; Butler, Giuliano and Guiso, 2009) they show that 
trusting others increases  the probability of becoming an entrepreneur by 1.3 percentage 
points.   Thébaud (2010) suggests that cultural beliefs about gender  are a pervasive factor 
that constrains women’s involvement in entrepreneurship across industrialized nations. 
Shared cultural beliefs about gender that prescribe different expectations of 
competence/skills for women and men and that frame entrepreneurship as a male-typed 
task may generate gender-biased assessments of entrepreneurial competence and business 
ideas and hence discourage female entrepreneurship. Furthermore the existence of gender 
stereotypes can also undermine the possibility of accessing to external sources of funding 
for female entrepreneurs.  Therefore cultural barriers may explain why men have been 
shown to be more likely to start a business than women (Blanchflower, 2000; Kim, Aldrich 
and Kester,2006, Guiso and Rustichini, 2011b). 
However,  alternative explanations are possible. For instance, one may argue that men are 
more endowed with managerial ability (in Lucas’s sense) or that men are more risk 
tolerant than women7, and therefore gender differences in risk preferences (or in 
managerial ability) can explain the gender entrepreneurship gap.    
As observed by Guiso and Rustichini (2011b) however it is difficult to distinguish a 
measure of entrepreneurial ability or entrepreneurial attitude that it is not influenced by 
previous individual choices or by cultural norms about gender.  For instance, differences in 
risk aversion between the two genders may stem from differences in initial endowments or 
life-time wealth. Similarly, differences in the way men and women react to competition  
may not be due to an intrinsic dislike of competition among women but to the prevalence 
of culturally determined roles.  To avoid these problems Guiso and Rustichini (2011b) 
building on  Guiso and Rustichini (2011a)8  used a measure that reflects a biological 
component of the entrepreneurial ability given by prenatal exposure to testosterone (which 
is measured though the ratio between the second and the fourth digit)9  and combine it 
with variation in beliefs about men/women parity in areas where people are located. This 
                                               
7 There exists empirical evidences showing that in representative samples women are less willing to take risks 
than men ( Fehr et al., 2006 ;Guiso and Paiella,2008) 
8 In particular  Guiso and Rustichini ( 2011a) show that entrepreneur with  higher  prenatal exposure to 
testosterone  tend to manage larger firms and to experience faster average growth over the years they manage 
the firm. Furthermore testosterone exposure is positively correlated with  entrepreneurial skills such the 
ability to stand effort, cognitive ability and optimism. 
9 The digit ratio is considered a reliable marker of the exposure to testosterone in the fetal period, with a 
lower ratio index associated with a higher level of androgens. 
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allows to explore whether women potentially endowed with intrinsic entrepreneurial 
ability actually succeed in becoming entrepreneurs or rather whether they have to give up 
because they face stronger cultural barriers than men. Finally, Guiso and Rustichini 
(2011b) show  that  in a random sample of individuals, men tend to have a lower digit ratio 
than women, hence a higher biological entrepreneurial predisposition,  however when a 
sample of entrepreneur is considered women have a lower second to fourth digit ratio. 
Furthermore  they show  that in regions  where the women are less emancipated, i.e. region 
where the traditional vision of the female role is predominant, their average digit ratio is 
lower than that of men  compared to region where women are more emancipated.  This 
finding is consistent with the existence of gender related obstacles to entrepreneurship so 
that only women with well above average entrepreneurial skills find attractive to become 
entrepreneur. 
Also religion may play a role in determining attitude towards entrepreneurship. Max 
Weber (1930) explained the origin of the capitalism, among other factors, by the 
development of a moral system, which he called “the Protestant Ethic”10.  The term 
Protestant ethic is still used to describe a positive attitude to hard work, possibly, 
unconsciously as a way of indicating an explanation of social approval. Using data from 
Britain, Clark and Drinkwater (2000) found that all else equal, exponents of religions that 
imply positive attitude towards entrepreneurship, i.e. Islam, Sikh and Hindu, had 
significantly higher probabilities of becoming entrepreneurs than  Christians from ethnic 
minorities were. Using retrospective career life-history data from West Germany, Carroll 
and Mosakowski (1987) found some support for the classic Protestant ethic argument. 
Protestants show a greater rate of movement into self-employment, as do the other non-
Catholic religions. However there are empirical works that have not found religion as a 
significant determinant of entrepreneurship (Pickless and O’Farrell, 1987; Pickless and 
O’Farrell,1989). 
Reynolds et al (1999) argue that both the stories in the media about successful 
entrepreneurs and the respect for those who start a new business, may be indicators of a 
culture that attach an high social value to entrepreneurship.  In particular, Reynolds et al. 
(1999) have found a positive (however their sample was limited to ten countries)  
correlation of about 0.45 between respect for entrepreneurs and the rate of firm start-ups. 
In  Errore. L'origine riferimento non è stata trovata., we have replicated Reynolds et al.’ s 
analysis using  GEM11  master data 2007. In particular the GEM tea index for 42 countries 
is plotted against: the percentage of individuals declaring that in their country there is a lot 
of media attention for entrepreneurs (a), the percentage of individuals who have declared 
that people in their country attach high status to successful entrepreneurs (b), the 
                                               
10 The notion of the Protestant Ethic is based on two fundamental concepts: the idea of “calling” and the 
“Puritan asceticism”. The notion of calling requires individuals to fulfill their duty in this world and interpret 
occupational success as a sign of being elected, and the notion of Puritan asceticism adds the positive 
evaluation of hard work and a negative view of idleness, luxury, and time wasting. 
11 The Global Entrepreneurship Monitor (GEM) research program is an annual assessment of the national 
level of entrepreneurial activity conducted by the GEM consortium. The aim of the research program is to 
obtain internationally comparative high quality research data on entrepreneurial activity at the national 
level. Representative samples of at least 2,000 individuals in the adult population are annually drawn for 
every  country.  The GEM tea index is defined as percentage of 18-64 population who are either a nascent 
entrepreneur, i.e. actively involved in setting up a business that they will own or co-own, or owner-manager 
of a new business  , i.e. a business with less than 3.5 years of existence. 
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percentage of individuals who believe that in their country entrepreneurship is regarded as 
a good career choice (c). The three cultural variables are all significantly correlated with 
the index of entrepreneurial activity.  Nevertheless the direction of the causality is an open 
issue here, since one may expect that the larger the number of entrepreneurs the more 
attention media will put on them and  more socially acceptable becomes this career choice. 
At the level of more deeply rooted values, Shapero and Sokol argue: 
 
« […] the social and cultural factors that enter into the formation of entrepreneurial 
events are most felt through the formation of individual value systems. More specifically, 
in a social system that places a high value on the formation of new ventures, more 
individuals will choose that path …. More diffusely, a social system that places a high 
value on innovation, risk-taking, and independence is more likely to produce 
entrepreneurial events than a system with contrasting values» (1982,p.83) 
 
Figure 1: TEA index against cultural manifestations 
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Giving empirical support to the above cited statement, several studies have found that 
entrepreneurs assign more importance to their independence (Reynolds,1999; 
Blanchflower and Oswald, 1998; Blanchflower, 2000; Blanchflower, Oswald and Stutzer, 
2001) then employees. Moreover, there is large empirical evidence showing that 
entrepreneurial activity is characterized by high failure rates and low average returns12  
but, at the same time, by high job satisfaction: one may think that individuals attach value 
to some non pecuniary characteristics of entrepreneurship, i.e. independence, yielding 
benefits which induce  entrepreneurs to be relatively more willing to forgo income and/or 
to bear the costs of increased income risk levels.  
Frey and Benz (2003) explicitly traced the greater satisfaction to the use of initiative and to 
the weakness of hierarchy that characterizes entrepreneurship. Nevertheless, to confirm 
this idea one needs to show that entrepreneurs have alternative options with higher 
income and hence to show it is not necessity to push them to entrepreneurship. Using 
GEM master data (2007), Table 1 shows which percentage of  entrepreneurs has declared 
that they have been pulled (or pushed in the case of necessity entrepreneurs) to 
entrepreneurship, because they desire independence,  to increase their income, to 
maintain their income,  they have no other way of earning a living (necessity-motivated 
entrepreneurs), respectively.  Generally speaking, in more developed countries the 
majority of individuals opts for entrepreneurship because they desire independence while 
income motivations are prevalent in less developed countries. 
This simple descriptive statistics suggest that one needs caution in interpreting the 
direction of the causality between cultural values and economic outcomes. On one side, it 
is possible that developed countries are those characterized by better job opportunities and 
hence the decision of becoming entrepreneur is mainly driven by the importance that 
national culture attach to independence, on the other  it is reasonable to think that it  is 
                                               
12 For instance, Hamilton (2000) has shown that,  in the United States, median entrepreneurs’ earnings after 
10 years in business are 35 percent less than the predicted alternative wage on a paid job of the same 
duration. 
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economic development to shift the focus of the people from survival values to self-
affirmation values (Inglehart, 1997). 
Culture may also influence risk preference. In despite of its importance in determining 
economic choices, the  theorized (Bisin and Verdier 2000, 2001)13 existence of a process of 
cultural transmission of risk preferences has received (at least to our knowledge) very 
scant attention on the empirical side. 
Guiso and Paiella (2008) using Italian survey data show  that when a set of dummies 
capturing the region of birth of the respondents are regressed together with a very large set 
of other controls against a measure of risk aversion,  they are still  economically and 
statistically significant. They interpret this finding as evidence of  existence of regional 
differences in risk predisposition and culture that are transmitted with upbringing within 
the family. 
Dohmen et al (2006) document a robust intergenerational correlation in risk attitudes 
using answers from a  large representative survey of adults living in Germany. 
In particular they show  that parents’ differences in risk taking across contexts– financial 
matters, health, career, car driving, and leisure activities,  are reproduced in the child. 
Moreover,  they  show that individuals tend to marry persons with the similar traits, and 
that this mating strategy reinforces the impact of fathers on children. 
However Dohmen et al. are not able to establish if the process of transmission is  due to 
genetics, to  child learning by imitation, or to  deliberate efforts by parents to shape the 
preferences and beliefs of their children (as in Bisin and Verdier). 
Therefore, the existence of a process of cultural transmission of risk preference has 
received some promising clues; however more robust empirical evidence is required to 
conclude that risk preference is culturally transmitted.  
Cultural beliefs  and values may also influence the attitude toward innovativeness and the 
latter plays a central role in the Schumpeterian theory of entrepreneurship (Schumpeter, 
1934). Even if Schumpeter theory was oriented on individual motivations and not directed 
to study cultural values,  it is reasonable to think that  some national cultures could 
encourage the development of these motivations more than others. Several authors in 
social psychology have argued that innovativeness is tied with the extent to which cultural 
values promote autonomy over embeddedness.  Supporting this view,  Mueller and 
Thomas (2000) studying the cultural orientation of personality traits, show that the level 
of innovativeness is positively correlated with  the degree of individualism of the country of 
origin  and negatively with the degree of uncertainty avoidance 14 and hence conclude that 
                                               
13 Bisin and Verdier (2000) model each parent as wishing to transmit his /her traits to his/her sons. Hence 
they can decide to exert effort to influence their children's process of preference formation. The effective 
socialization of children to a particular religious or ethnic trait is then determined by the interaction of the 
direct socialization effort of parents and the indirect influence of society toward assimilation (the melting pot 
factor). The direct socialization technology of parents operates at the level of the family. Families in which 
parents share the same cultural trait (homogamous families) enjoy a more efficient socialization technology 
for their shared trait than families with mixed cultural parents (heterogamous families). Therefore, each 
individual's choice of the marriage mate crucially determines his/her ability to transmit his/her set of 
cultural traits to their eventual children. 
14 Individualism and uncertainty  avoidance are two important cultural dimensions studied by Hofstede 
(1980) . The former reflects degree of emphasis that a society  place on individual accomplishment rather 
than group accomplishment. The latter refers to a society’s tolerance for uncertainty and  ambiguity. It 
indicates to what extent a culture programs its members to feel either uncomfortable or comfortable in 
unstructured situations 
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both these two cultural dimensions are conducive to entrepreneurship. Finally,  Ruiu 
(2012) analyzes the  impact of fatalistic beliefs on the entrepreneurial choice.  
 
 
Table 1: : Entrepreneurial motivations 
OECD Indepen- Increase Maintain Other Non OECD Indepen Increase Maintain Other 
Countries dence income Income   Countries Dence income income   
AUT 65.36 22.53 4.09 8.02 ARG 40.15 43.75 13.6 2.51 
BEL 33.93 37.9 13.79 14.38 BRA 35.27 52.26 12.47 0 
CHL 43.57 47.75 8.12 0.56 CHN 36.08 57.28 5.05 1.6 
DNK 55.89 35.29 1.27 7.56 COL 39.37 50.15 9.98 0.51 
FIN 59.66 29.74 3.57 7.03 HVR 49.85 28.08 18.19 3.88 
FRA 70.42 9.93 19.64 0 DOM 23.66 63.89 12.45 0 
GRC 36.47 60.27 3.25 0 HOK 42.13 48.87 3.45 5.55 
HUN 43.06 39.64 17.31 0 IND 49.07 30.66 20.27 0 
ISL 46.09 36.5 4.12 13.29 KZK 23.11 63.03 13.85 0 
IRL 64.78 21.94 4.5 8.77 LVA 29.96 70.04 0 0 
ISR 41.99 42.7 11.36 3.95 PER 25.35 64.41 10.24 0 
ITA 52.35 39.24 5.51 2.9 PUE 35.33 49.6 15.07 0 
JPN 57.82 25.16 13.25 3.77 ROM 48.27 51.73 0 0 
NLD 67.68 6.43 10.61 15.28 RUS 44.35 37.9 17.75 0 
NOR 43.5 32.51 17.14 6.86 SRB 35.72 51.33 12.95 0 
PRT 24.74 53.23 18.48 3.55 THA 47.5 45.55 6.95 0 
SLV 63.06 30.32 2.91 3.71 TUR 41.65 34.79 20.91 2.65 
ESP 52.73 34.77 8.32 4.17 UAE 56.24 37.91 3.88 1.97 
SWE 51.01 25.71 3.39 19.9 URY 39.31 50.73 7.79 2.17 
CHE 72.33 12.56 8.53 6.58 VNL 41.65 48.53 5.68 4.14 
GBR 64.73 26.24 5.78 3.25     
 
    
USA 52.07 34.03 10.21 3.7           
Source: GEM Master data 2007 
 
The above empirical and theoretical  findings  indubitably show that cultural values and 
beliefs have an impact on people’s choices, attitudes and behaviors, but the view that 
culture impacts on institutions is subject to the criticism of reverse causality, i.e. the 
argument according to which the causal relation does not go only from culture to 
institutions but also operates vice versa: that is, culture shapes institutions and 
institutions shape culture.15 
                                               
15 A well known definition of institutions can be found in North : 
«[…] the humanly devised constraints that structure human interaction.  They are made up of formal 
constraints (e.g., rules, laws, constitutions), informal constraints (e.g., norms of behavior, conventions, 
self-imposed codes of conduct), and their enforcement characteristics.  Together they define the incentive 
structure of societies and specifically economies. » (1994, p.360) 
 Since Economists  often define culture as the social norms and the individual beliefs that sustain Nash 
equilibria as focal points in repeated social interactions (eg. Schotter 1981, Myerson 1991, Greif 1994), one 
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According  to Roland (2004) culture tends to be more slow-moving than political or legal 
institutions. Therefore, one can argue that culture might have an important effect on the 
choice of political and legal institutions itself. Among economists Guiso et al. (2003, 2006, 
2009) share this view that cultural values and beliefs are the outcome of a process of 
cultural sedimentation taking place over very long time spans. As such, they are very stable 
and they may show high resilience in the face of both external, e.g. military invasions, 
immigration, or internal shocks, e.g. radical political reforms (Schwartz, Bardi, and 
Bianchi 2000; Inglehart and Baker, 2000). Of course, older cultures (South European, 
Chinese, Arab), will display more resilience relative to new ones (Australia, USA). This 
explains why the former cultures appear more conservative, less dynamic  and more prone 
to oppose institutional innovations.  
Tabellini (2010) suggests that culture is an important channel through which historical 
institutions influence current institutions.. In particular, he maintains that a low level of 
trust in others and scant confidence in the link between effort and economic success  
(fatalism in our interpretation), are different cultural traits, but they are both typical of 
hierarchical societies characterized by marked pessimism about the correctness of other 
people’s actions. In such societies, the community requests the state to intervene by 
enacting rigorous regulations that prevent people from assuming opportunistic behaviors. 
These societies are also characterized by the central role of the family in the individual’s 
life (Banfield, 1958). Young people tend to remain longer in the family of origin and to 
form their own families later. The traditional family values (obedience, respect for the 
father, etc.) are given priority over all other values (autonomy, good civic attitudes, etc). 
The family comes first, and people outside the household are regarded with suspicion and 
considered untrustworthy. This “family-centered” way of life may be an important 
determinant of the persistence of cultural traits. 
Using differences in constraints on executive across a sub-national units (within current 
nations), as an instrument for contemporary culture variables, and controlling for current 
institutional aspects, Tabellini finds that culture is strongly correlated with regional 
economic development.  
On the same line of research Gorodnichenko and Roland (2010) show that culture 
continues to play a statistically significant and quantitatively important role in determining 
long-run growth even after controlling for measures of institutions, implying that culture 
has an effect on economic development that is independent of institutions. Furthermore, 
they find that there is a two-way causality between culture and institutions thus suggesting 
that institutions are in part determined by culture.  
Putting  together all these theoretical and empirical findings,  we believe that to justify the 
choice of considering culture as a determinant of economic behavior, it is therefore of 
crucial importance that the cultural traits which we consider not only influence economic 
                                                                                                                                                            
may conclude that culture is one aspect of broadly defined institutions.  However, this interpretation is 
clearly conflicting with Hofstede who considers values as a manifestation of culture and hence as implication  
culture as determinant of the institutional settings. In particular, he sustains that:  
 «the stability of cultural patterns can be ascribed to reinforcement by the institutions which themselves are 
products of the dominant value systems» (1980, p. 233). 
Hence for Hofstede, culture shapes institutions and the latter reinforce the former being a sort of instrument 
to promote culture. 
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behavior and institutions but also are quite stable over time, being a legacy transmitted 
from one generation to the next . 
Moving from the role or culture to that of institutions, a large body of economic literature 
has stressed the link between institutions and economic performance. In the context of 
entrepreneurship, institutions affect both the generation of recognizable business 
opportunities  and the value attached to them.  In particular, entrepreneurial opportunities 
are shaped by formal and informal institutions (Baumol  1990, Acs et al. 2004,  Sobel 
2008, Bloom, Sadun, Van Reenen 2009Klapper, Lewin and Quesada Delgado, 2009; 
Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes, Shleifer, 2002), e.g. product market regulation, 
labour market regulation, law enforcement.  Baumol (1990) observes  that entrepreneurial 
activity is distributed between productive and unproductive  entrepreneurship. He 
hypothesizes that entrepreneurial individuals channel their efforts in different directions 
depending on the quality of prevailing economic, political, and legal institutions. This 
institutional structure determines the relative reward to investing entrepreneurial energies 
into productive market activities versus unproductive political and legal activities (e.g., 
lobbying and lawsuits). Good institutions (secure property rights, a fair and balanced 
judicial system, contract enforcement, and effective constitutional limits on government's 
ability to transfer wealth through taxation and regulation) shift entrepreneurial activity 
towards productive entrepreneurship strengthening economic development (Acemoglu 
and Johnson, 2005).   Errore. L'origine riferimento non è stata trovata. effectively 
summarizes  Baumol’s  argument.  
 
Figure 2: Institutions and entrepreneurship 
 
Source: Sobel (2008) 
 
Thanks to an increasing  availability of data, there is a flourishing body of empirical 
literature looking at the relation between institutional settings and entrepreneurship. In 
this context, Aidis et al. (2009) by combining country-level institutional indicators for 44 
countries with working age population survey data taken from GEM show that two specific 
institutional dimensions – the rule of law, and a more limited state sector– are 
significantly  and positively associated with entrepreneurial entry.  
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Wennekers et al. (2005)  explore the relationship between entrepreneurship levels, 
economic development and institutional variables. In particular they use 2002  GEM  data 
from 36 countries to obtain for each country a mean value of nascent entrepreneurship 
rates and they regress this variable against a set of  demographic, economic and 
institutional variable.  
In particular their  explanatory variables include income per capita, variables measuring 
demographics (population growth and education), and institutions (fiscal legislation, social 
security system and administrative requirements for starting a new business). Their results 
indicate that there is a positive effect of population growth on entrepreneurship 
development. For what regards institutions, they find a negative effect of social security 
but a positive effect of tax revenues as a percentage of GDP on nascent entrepreneurship. 
The impact of taxes on the level of entrepreneurial activity is complex and even 
paradoxical (Verheul et al., 2002). On the one hand high tax rates reduce the return on 
entrepreneurship, on the other hand self-employment may offer greater opportunities to 
evade or avoid tax liabilities (Parker,1996). Hence the result about the positive effects of 
the tax revenues  on entrepreneurship are consistent both with the “incentives for tax 
avoidance” theory and  with a more benevolent vision that high-tax countries spend more 
on infrastructure and hence provide a better environment for new firms. The effect of 
social security on entrepreneurial activity may also be two-sided. First, there is a negative 
impact in so far as generous social security for employees increases the opportunity costs 
of entrepreneurship. Second, social security in general may have a positive effect on 
entrepreneurial activity by creating a safety net in the case of business failure.  Koellinger  
and Minniti (2009) analyzing a cross-country panel of 16 OECD countries from 2002 to 
2005 find that higher unemployment benefits crowd out nascent entrepreneurial activity 
and this result holds regardless of entrepreneurial motivation (necessity or opportunity) 
and entrepreneurial type (imitative or innovative) hence the first thesis on the negative 
effect of the social security system seems to be supported by empirical evidence. 
On the same line of research, Van Stel et al. (2007) analyze the effect of a particular set of 
institutions, business regulations, on nascent entrepreneurs and young businesses (defined 
as less than 42 months old). Their analysis is based on countries aggregate mean values 
from GEM data (2002 - 2005 for 39 countries). Their measurement of business 
regulations is drawn from the World Bank’s Doing Business indicators and uses five 
categories: (1) starting a business, (2) hiring and firing workers, (3) obtaining credit, (4) 
paying taxes and (5) closing a business. Their results indicate that minimum capital 
requirements and labour market rigidity  have a negative effect while availability of credit 
information has a positive effect on nascent entrepreneurship rates.  
Fonseca et al. (2001) and Pissarides (2003) study the effects of start-up costs in a 
matching model where workers are heterogeneous with respect to the potential profit of 
starting a new firm. Both contributions argue that lower start-up costs lead to the creation 
of more firms and less unemployment. However the effect of reducing start-up costs on the 
efficiency of the market is ambiguous in their model: if too many workers start new firms, 
the workforce may become too small and output suffers. Building on Fonseca et al., 
Dulleck  et al. (2006)  show that there is a double positive effect for the economy when the 
startup cost  are reduced. In particular they study the implications of lower start-up costs 
in a situation where new firms with high productivity can be created only by high-skilled 
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persons. Lower start-up costs then affect education choices by improving the options of 
skilled workers. More workers obtain education and more high-skill firms will be set up, 
which is the first positive effect as in Fonseca et al. (2001). The increase in the proportion 
of workers who are educated induces, through a search externality, a second positive effect 
inducing an increase in the creation of high skill vacancies by incumbent firms. That is, 
because the odds of getting high-skilled workers to apply for a given vacancy increases, 
already existing firms create more jobs for high-skilled workers. 
Klapper et al. (2009) study the impact of entry costs in terms of complying with 
bureaucratic requirements for incorporation on the creation of new firms. Their results 
indicate the rate of new corporation creation in industries that tend to be high-entry is 
relatively lower in countries with higher entry costs. 
Finally, Guiso and Schivardi (2011) extend Lucas’ model to investigate two potential 
explanations of differences in entrepreneurial density across locations: entry costs and 
external effects. In the first case, there are heterogeneous costs of entry across locations 
hence the locations characterized by lower costs of setting up a firm end up with more 
entrepreneurs and more firms because even relatively less talented individuals will find it 
profitable to start a business. The second possibility is that the distribution of individual 
productivity is shifted by local factors, for instance because of differences in learning 
opportunities, knowledge spillovers or intermediate input variety. They show that the two 
assumptions have very contrasting implications regarding the relation between the 
propensity of individuals to become entrepreneurs and their average productivity. Under 
entry cost heterogeneity hypothesis, areas with lower entry costs  there should be 
characterized by more entrepreneurs and  average TFP should be lower. Thus, in 
equilibrium there should be a negative correlation between firm density in a given location 
and their TFP. On the contrary, with externality heterogeneity, areas with stronger 
externalities should be characterized by higher entrepreneurial ability  and more 
entrepreneurs. In this case, the model  predicts that in equilibrium there should be a 
positive correlation between the share of entrepreneurs in a given location and their firms' 
TFP. They test these implications on a sample of Italian firms and unambiguously reject 
the entry costs explanation in favor of the externalities one.   
Institutional factors can affect entrepreneurship also through their relation with prior 
beliefs.   
Aghion et al. (2009) analyze  the complex relation among a culturally-based belief, i.e.  
trust, the level of regulation, and the entrepreneurial outcome. In particular they propose a 
model where  those who have not invested in social capital intended as civic attitudes, 
impose a negative externality on others when they become entrepreneurs (e.g.  
environmental pollution) while those who have not invested do not. The community 
regulates entry into entrepreneurial activity when the expected negative externalities are 
large. But regulation itself must be implemented by government officials, who are corrupt 
if they had not invested in social capital. As a consequence, when entrepreneurship is 
restricted through regulation, investment in social capital may not pay. Hence if people 
expect to live in a civil community (high level of trust in other people) , they expect low 
levels of regulation, and so invest in social capital. Their beliefs are justified, and 
investment leads to civility, low regulation, and high levels of entrepreneurial activity. 
When in contrast people expect to live in an uncivil community (low level of trust), they do 
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not invest in social capital and remain uncivil and unproductive. Their beliefs are again 
justified, because a lack of investment in social capital leads to incivility, high regulation, 
high corruption, and low entrepreneurship.  
Supporting this view on the empirical side, Aghion et al. (2009) show that distrust in 
others is strongly positively correlated with various measures of regulation (product and 
labor market regulation, judicial procedure).16 
Pinotti (2009) has developed a model whose main conclusions are that, within each 
economy, the individual demand for regulation depends negatively on trust towards 
others, and that ignoring trust (as a proxy for average trustworthiness) biases estimations 
of the effects of market failures upwards. Licht et al. (2007) focus on three cultural 
dimensions proposed by Schwartz (1994): autonomy/embeddedness (relative to the 
relation between individual and group), hierarchical/egalitarianism (relative to the ways in 
which socially responsible behavior is ensured), and  mastery/harmony (relative to 
humankind’s relations with the natural and social worlds). They find that countries 
oriented to autonomy and egalitarianism are characterized by better social institutions 
(greater rule of law, less corruption, more democratic accountability). In order to assess 
the causality from culture to institutions, they used the grammar of pronouns as an 
instrumental variable for autonomy/embeddedness. Drawing on psychological evidence, 
they argued that languages in which it is permitted to drop the person-indexing pronouns 
(I, you, etc.) reflect a more embedded culture. By contrast, languages that require the 
explicit use of pronouns place more emphasis on a person’s contextualization and 
uniqueness. 
Finally, D’orlando, Ferrante and Ruiu (2011) show  that fatalism is at least partly culturally 
determined and that, controlling for the level of job protection and other institutional 
settings,  the individuals who trust less others and are characterized by fatalistic beliefs 
tend to demand more job security. 17   
Therefore, it is reasonable to suppose that institutions affect the expected value of different 
occupational choices, and by doing so, the actual contribution of entrepreneurship to 
growth.  The connections among cultural beliefs, institutions and entrepreneurship are 
shown in Figure 3. Individuals holding different culturally-based beliefs recognize business 
opportunity and  assess the value of the latter differently. Institutions affect recognizable 
business opportunity and their value to individuals. The joint action of culturally-based 
beliefs and institutions determine how many people choose entrepreneurship and, most 
                                               
16 Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales (2003,2006,2009), Fernandez, Fogli (2009) show that certain behavioral 
patterns (e.g., the level of trust in others,  fertility and women’s labor supply) of second or third generation 
immigrants are highly correlated with these variables in their country of origin. They argue that the origin of 
this observed persistence must be cultural. 
17  D’Orlando, Ferrante and Ruiu (2011) and Ruiu (2012)  show that fatalism is a very time-persistent beliefs 
and  that it is strongly tied up with religious beliefs In particular , Ruiu (2012) using WVS data, shows that 
controlling for a very large set of socio-demographic variables and country fixed effect,  being “Orthodox”, 
“Muslim”, “Evangelical”, “Buddhist”, “Protestant”, “Catholic”, or to a religion different from the formers,   
corresponds to a increase  in the probability of being a person with extreme fatalistic tendency  respectively 
of 3%, 3.3%, 3.9%, 3.5%, 3%, 2.9%, 1.8%. Other evidences on the cultural origin of fatalistic beliefs can be 
found in Mueller and Thomas (2000). They show that fatalistic beliefs are strongly correlated with 
Hofstede’s cultural dimensions. 
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important, who becomes an entrepreneur, i.e. the typical profile of entrepreneurs in terms 
of subjective characteristics that are relevant in entrepreneurial activities.  
 
Figure 3: Occupational choices and entrepreneurship 
Source: De Bruin and Ferrante, 2011 
 
 
On these premises, the present  paper  investigates how the institutional setting  shapes the 
entrepreneurial selection. In particular,  we try to establish  which are the “good” 
institutions, i.e. those institutions that  favor opportunity   driven entrepreneurship, which 
presumable best represents the productive entrepreneurship in Baumol’s sense. 
Furthermore, we are also interested in  establishing   whether these “good” institutions 
produce the same or different impacts also on necessity driven entrepreneurship.   
 
2.1. A deeper glance at fatalism 
Fatalism as typical cultural belief has been neglected in economics particularly as regards 
the analysis of entrepreneurship.  Tabellini (2010) uses the perceived degree of control 
over life-events as one of the cultural determinants of economic development. Wu (2005) 
finds that people characterized by a fatalistic view of life tend to save less than “not 
fatalistic individuals”. Ferrante, D’Orlando, Ruiu (2010) find that  more “fatalistic 
individuals” tend to demand more job security. Harper (1998,2003) discusses the 
interdependence between entrepreneurship and the locus of control. In particular, he 
argues that an internal locus of control increases entrepreneurial alertness. This increased 
alertness, in its turn, leads to more opportunity perception and, therefore, to more 
entrepreneurship.  However,  there is no formal model explaining how external beliefs 
influence the choice of becoming an entrepreneur.  
Empirical analysis has obtained mixed results on the effect of locus on entrepreneurship.  
Some empirical works find a significant positive correlation between internal beliefs and 
the probability of being an entrepreneur (Evans and Leighton (1989) and Schiller and 
Crewson (1997), Kaufmann et al (1995)) while others have not been able to find a 
significant relation (Begley and Boyd (1987), van Praag and van Ophem (1995) ). 
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However, two main drawbacks in the literature may  be underlined: is fatalism a mere 
consequence of objective individual characteristics or does it depend on cultural heritage? 
Determining whether fatalism can be considered a cultural belief is an important step in 
dealing with the reverse causality problem.  The absence of clear theoretical predictions on 
the effect of external beliefs  makes the econometrician’s work difficult.   
One can make different conjectures on how fatalism  influences entrepreneurial choice. 
Our empirical paper is based on Ruiu’s model (2012). Ruiu (2012) models18 the process of 
discovering entrepreneurial opportunity by using search theory. In his framework, an 
entrepreneur is someone searching for an entrepreneurial project that is sufficiently 
productive to ensure a higher return than wage earning.  He shows that fatalism, by 
undermining the perceived link between the effort  exerted in searching and the output 
that can be obtained, reduces the perceived probability of finding a ‘good enough’ project 
and hence increases the level of search ability (this latter is determined by individual 
characteristics positively evaluated also in the job market, e.g. cognitive ability) required to 
enter into entrepreneurship. Therefore, for a given level of ability, higher fatalistic 
tendencies imply a lower probability of becoming an entrepreneur. However, this result  
does not rule out the existence of ‘out of necessity’ entrepreneurs, i.e. low-ability owners of 
low productivity firms that decide to pursue an entrepreneurial career because they lack 
valid income-generating alternatives.Therefore, low-ability individuals with scant options 
in paid employment or alternative self employment alternatives, may prefer to leave 
everything to luck,  undertaking highly uncertain occupations.  The main prediction of the 
model is that fatalism reduces the likelihood that high-ability individuals  (those for whom 
the entrepreneurial choice is mainly driven by the value of the discovered opportunity 
rather than necessity) opt for entrepreneurship.  At the same time, fatalism may play a 
minor role for low-ability entrepreneurs whose choice is mainly driven by the paucity of 
job alternatives. This may explain why econometric analyses that put both type of 
entrepreneurs together often find an non-significant relation between beliefs and the 
probability of being an entrepreneur.  In  Appendix II we present a simple model 
explaining in greater detail how fatalism affects entrepreneurial selection. 
 
 
3. Empirical strategy and results 
The data sources used in our empirical investigation are the World Value Survey 
(WVS), the Global Entrepreneurship Monitor (GEM) and Gwartney and Lawson (2009)19. 
The WVS is a worldwide investigation about basic values and beliefs of individuals in a 
large cross-section of countries (more than 80) conducted by the World Value Survey 
Association. The survey  contains information about demographics (sex, age, education, 
etc.), self-reported economic conditions, political preferences, attitudes, religion. In 
particular, WVS contains a very appropriate question to assess the degree of fatalism of the 
respondents.20 A drawback of the WVS is that not being designed for the study of 
                                               
18 See appendix II. 
19 See appendix I for a description of these data sources. 
20 «Some people feel they have completely free choice and control over their lives, while other people feel 
that what they do has no real effect on what happens to them. Please use this scale (1 means “none at all” 
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occupational choice,  it doesn’t allow to obtain a clear identification of  entrepreneurs. In 
particular, WVS allows  to distinguish the self-employed from the entrepreneur strictu 
sensu but it doesn’t include any information about the motivation behind the 
entrepreneurial choice. To overcome this drawback an integration with GEM data has been 
necessary.  We used data from 2001 to 2008. Descriptive statistics are shown in appendix I 
(Table 7). 
In our analysis, we separated self-employed individuals from entrepreneurs. In 
particular two conditions had to be simultaneously fulfilled to consider an individual an 
entrepreneur: 
 The individual declared that s/he was self-employed in reply to the question: : “Are you 
employed now or not? If yes: About how many hours a week? If more than one job: only 
for the main job” (1 = full time; 2 = part time; 3 = self employed; 4 = retired; 5 = 
housewife; 6 = student; 7 = unemployed; 8 = other). 
 The individual declared21 that s/he was an owner/manager of a business in reply to the 
question: “In which profession/occupation are you doing most of your work? If you do 
not work currently, characterize your major work in the past! What is/was your job 
there? 
GEM data allows  to identity more narrowly entrepreneurs than WVS data and to 
distinguish between opportunity driven entrepreneurs (those who have declared of being 
entrepreneurs because they have seen a good business opportunity) and necessity driven 
entrepreneurs (those who have declared of being entrepreneurs because they have not 
better chance to work).   
In our analysis we address the following questions: b) do cultural beliefs, i.e. 
fatalism and trust, affect occupational choices, i.e. the decision to become entrepreneurs? 
b) do culture and institutions affect how people perceive the presence of business 
opportunities? c)  does fatalism affect opportunity and necessity driven entrepreneurs 
differently? 
 
 
3.1. Culture, institutions and occupational choices 
Our first step consists of estimating the impact of culture and institutions on 
occupational choices. In short, the relation to be estimated is: 
 
( )*i 0 1 i 2 4 i 3 i i iy =γ +γ fatalism +γ Institutions+γ trust +γ X +ε         where ε i.i.d. N 0,σ  
Where  *
i
y   represents the utility of being entrepreneur that we cannot observe. Xi is 
a vector of controls for individual characteristics (age, gender, education, etc.),  
                                                                                                                                                            
and 10 means “a great deal”) to indicate how much freedom of choice and control you feel you have over 
the way your life turns out.» 
 
21  Options: 1 Employer/manager of establishment with 10 or more employees; 2 Employer/manager of 
establishment with less than 10 employees;3 Professional worker lawyer; accountant, teacher, etc; 4 
Supervisory - office worker: supervises others; 5 Non-manual - office worker: non-supervisory;6 Foreman 
and supervisor;7 Skilled manual worker; 8 Semi-skilled manual worker;9 Unskilled manual worker;10 
Farmer: has own farm;11 Agricultural worker;12 Member of armed forces, security personnel; 13 Never 
had a job; 14 other job”. 
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Institutions represents the controls for institutional settings.  Since one cannot observe  *
i
y    
but only a dummy variable that takes value one when the utility of being an entrepreneur is 
higher than the utility of being a worker (for simplicity normalized to zero): 
 
{ }*iy =1 y >0i  
So, for i=1,...,n,   we are interested in:  
 
(1) 
 
where G is a Normal C.D.F. (alternatively a logistic distribution can be used to specify the 
link function G).  We estimate the latter equation using  data  from two different sources: 
the World Values Survey (WVS) and the Global Entrepreneurship Monitor (GEM).  The 
WVS allows us to control for variables that may be very important in the choice of 
becoming an entrepreneur like the level of risk tolerance and the self-perceived level of 
creativity. Hence in the case of WVS, the dependent variable used in equation (1)  will be a 
dummy variable named entrepreneur that is equal to one when  two conditions are 
simultaneously verified: the individual declares to be self-employed in question V24122 and 
the individual declares to being an employer/manager in question V242. Indeed, even if an 
entrepreneur is surely a self-employed, the definition of self-employment doesn’t coincide 
with that of entrepreneurship. Self-employment is a “catch-all definition”,  that  puts 
together lawyer, dentist, craftsmen and other professional men with entrepreneurs. 
Therefore with our empirical definition,  we are able to separate the entrepreneur from 
other types of self-employed. 
As said above the WVS, in addition to a question on trust in others, includes a question on 
fatalistic beliefs. In particular our measure of fatalism is based on the following question: 
«Some people feel they have completely free choice and control over their lives, while 
other people feel that what they do has no real effect on what happens to them. Please use 
this scale (1 means “none at all” and 10 means “a great deal”) to indicate how much 
freedom of choice and control you feel you have over the way your life turns out.» 
We reordered this variable in a such a way that a higher value indicates higher fatalistic 
beliefs. Other important controls that we include in our analysis are the following23: 
                                               
22  V241: “Are you employed now or not? If yes: About how many hours a week? If more than one job: only 
for the main job” (1 = full time; 2 = part time; 3 = self employed; 4 = retired; 5 = housewife; 6 = student; 7 = 
unemployed; 8 = other). 
V242: “In which profession/occupation are you doing most of your work? If you do not work currently, 
characterize your major work in the past! What is/was your job there? 1 Employer/manager of 
establishment with 10 or more employees; 2 Employer/manager of establishment with less than 10 
employees;3 Professional worker lawyer; accountant, teacher, etc; 4 Supervisory - office worker: 
supervises others; 5 Non-manual - office worker: non-supervisory;6 Foreman and supervisor;7 Skilled 
manual worker; 8 Semi-skilled manual worker;9 Unskilled manual worker;10 Farmer: has own farm;11 
Agricultural worker;12 Member of armed forces, security personnel; 13 Never had a job; 14 other job”. 
23 Unfortunately  the variables creativity and attitude toward risk were introduced only in the fifth wave. For 
this reason, we decided to focus on this wave for the estimation of equation 1. 
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- Trust:  This variable is equal to one if an individual has answered “ most people can 
be trusted” to the following question: “Generally speaking, would you say that most 
people can be trusted or that you need  to be very careful in dealing with people?”.  
- Creativity:  This variable is based on the following WVS question : “Please indicate 
for each description whether that person is very much like you, like you, somewhat 
like you, not like you, or not at all like you? It is important to this person to think up 
new ideas and be creative; to do things one’s own way. We created a dummy 
variable for each of the possible answers. The reference category is very much like 
me.  
- Attitude toward risk:  This variable is based on the following WVS question : 
“Now I will briefly describe some people: “Adventure and taking risks are important 
to this person; to have an exciting life. Would you please indicate  whether that 
person is very much like you, like you, somewhat like you, not like you, or not at all 
like you?”  We created a dummy variable for each of the possible answers . The 
reference category is very much like me.  
Finally, we control for  the institutional  setting  using the following indicators in addition 
to country fixed effects (Gwartney and Lawson, 2009): 
- legal:  it is an index that measures the quality of the legal system. This index ranges 
from 0-10, where 0 corresponds to ‘no judicial independence’, ‘no trusted legal 
framework exists’, ‘no protection of intellectual property’, ‘no integrity of the legal 
system’ and 10 corresponds to ‘high judicial independence’, ‘trusted legal framework 
exists’, ‘protection of intellectual property’, ‘integrity of the legal system’.  
- labflex: this index measures the flexibility of the labour market and ranges from 0-
10, where 10 is the highest level of flexibility.   
- busflex:  This index is designed to identify the extent to which regulations and 
bureaucratic procedures restrain entry and reduce competition. It ranges from 0-10 
where 10 indicates the maximum level of flexibility in the regulation of business 
activities.  
Table 2 shows some descriptive statistics for the variables entrepreneur, labflex, legal, 
busflex . 
As said above we are also interested in establishing if institutions and fatalistic tendencies 
play a different role for different type of entrepreneurs, i.e. for opportunity and necessity 
driven entrepreneurs. To accomplish this end, we need to use a more refined data source 
on entrepreneurial motivation. The Global Entrepreneurship Monitor (GEM) data allows  
to identity more narrowly entrepreneurs than WVS data. A problem of GEM, is that it 
doesn’t contain any question on fatalistic beliefs, so we need to integrate the information 
on fatalism from WVS with the information on entrepreneurs coming from GEM. To this 
end we used an empirically strategy proposed by Algan and Cahuc (2007) to build a 
country level indicator of fatalism. In particular, in order to obtain this indicator we run an 
ordered probit regression where our measure of fatalism is regressed on a set of controls 
which allows to account for population composition effects and other possible confounding 
factors in the construction of the indicator. These controls are the gender of the 
respondent, the level of education, the marital status, the family income, the employment 
status, and  the perceived health status of the respondent, wave fixed effects, country fixed 
effect. It  follows that the fixed effect obtained for each country, i.e. the “country dummy 
variable”, is interpreted as the indicator of the country’s level of fatalism. To have the 
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widest span of countries we used all the five WVS waves to construct the indicator.  We use 
this indicator  as an explanatory variable (plus a set of socio-demographic controls) in the 
equation 1 estimated using GEM data24.   
To further investigate the role of institutions on determining opportunity and necessity 
entrepreneurship, in addition to above mentioned labflex and legal , we add the following 
institutional variable (also in this case the source is Gwartney and Lawson, 2009): 
-  administr: this index  is based on the Global Competitiveness Report 
question: “Complying with administrative requirements (permits, regulations, 
reporting) issued by the government in your country is  (1 = burdensome, 7 = not 
burdensome).”; 
- bribe : this  index is based on the Global Competitiveness Report questions. [1] 
“In your industry, how commonly would you estimate that firms make 
undocumented extra payments or bribes connected with the following: A–
Import and export permits; B–Connection to public utilities (e.g., telephone or 
electricity); C—Annual tax payments; D—Awarding of public contracts 
(investment projects); E—Getting favourable judicial decisions. Common (= 1) 
Never occur (= 7)”? [2] “Do illegal payments aimed at influencing government 
policies, laws or regulations have an impact on companies in your country: 1 = 
Yes, significant negative impact, 7 = No, no impact at all”? [3] “To what extent 
do government officials in your country show favouritism to well-connected 
firms and individuals when deciding upon policies and contracts: 1 = Always 
show favouritism, 7 = Never show favouritism”?; 
- Bureau: this index is  based on the Global Competitiveness Report question: 
“Standards on product/service quality, energy and other regulations (outside 
environmental regulations) in your country are: (1 = Lax or nonexistent, 7 = 
among the world’s most stringent)”; 
- Starting: This index is based on the World Bank’s Doing Business data on the 
amount of time and money it takes to start a new limited-liability business. 
Countries where it takes longer or is more costly to start a new business are 
given lower ratings.  
 
 
The results of our estimations for WVS data  are shown in Table 325. Estimations (2) and 
(3) include the role of institutions and (3) also country fixed effects. All demographics exert 
the expected impact on the probability to be an entrepreneur, thus confirming previous 
evidence. Education seems to produce non linear effects (sig. 1%).   As we expected, an 
increase in fatalistic tendencies leads to a decrease in the probability of being an 
entrepreneur in all our estimations (sig. 1%).  Personal traits such as risk propensity and 
creativity show the expected signs (sig. 1%) too. 
 
 
 
                                               
24 See  appendix I  (Table  8 and Table 9) for details on this indicator 
25 See appendix I for the definitions of the explanatory variables..  
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics: entrepreneurship and institutions 
Country Entr* labflex busflex legal Country Entr* labflex busflex Legal 
ARG 1.697 2.5 8.9 4.5 MDA 0.956 5.7 8.8 5.6 
AUS 4.011 4.6 9.9 8.6 MEX 4.872 4.7 8.9 5.6 
BFA 0.261 4.8 6.1 3.9 MLI 0.782 5.6 4.9 4.4 
BGR 0.599 4.5 8.7 5.5 MYS 3.081 5 8.8 6.9 
BRA 4.267 2.9 6.6 5.2 NLD 1.238 3.2 9.4 8.6 
CAN 2.126 5.4 9.9 8.2 NOR 3.317 2.8 9.7 9 
CHL 0.300 4.9 9 6.8 POL 0.800 4.8 8.1 5.7 
CHN 1.538 5.3 8.1 5.8 ROM 0.732 4.2 9.6 5.7 
CYP 6.571 3.6 . 7.6 RUS 0.394 6.8 9 5.6 
DEU 3.149 2.4 9 8.7 SRB 1.230 5 9.1 4.7 
ETH 1.467 4.6 5.7 4.5 SVN 1.157 2.9 7.8 6 
FIN 1.775 3.8 9.5 9 SWE 4.487 1.9 9.4 8.3 
FRA 3.197 2.4 9.8 7.2 THA 1.434 4.7 8.9 6.2 
GBR 1.825 5.8 9.6 8.5 TTO 2.495 5.3 8.6 5.2 
GEO 0.933 6.8 9.4 4.8 TUR 7.058 4 9.5 6.5 
GHA 0.391 . 6.8 4.9 TWN 0.652 5.9 7.8 6.6 
IDN 2.928 4.5 5.8 4 UKR 1.300 6.3 8.2 5.3 
IND 3.948 3.3 7 6.4 URY 2.000 3.3 7.6 5.8 
IRQ 0.407 . . . USA 1.922 7 9.8 7.6 
ITA 5.138 2.8 9.3 6.3 VNM 3.144 5.4 8.1 5.8 
JPN 0.821 4.6 9.2 7.8 ZAF 1.473 2.4 8.8 6.6 
MAR 5.333 5.3 9.3 6 ZMB 3.533 8.2 8.6 5.6 
*percentage 
         Source: WVS(2005) and Gwartney and Lawson(2009) 
 
Once we control for institutions and for country fixed effects, trust, legal and busflex are no 
longer statistically significant. Surprisingly, labor-market flexibility seems to exert a 
negative effect on  the probability of being an entrepreneur (sig. 10%;  as we will show, this 
result is confirmed using GEM data instead of WVS data).   
 
 
Table 3: Fatalism, institutions and entrepreneurship 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Probit Probit Probit 
age 4.003***(0.004) 3.502***(0.004) 3.792***(0.004) 
agesquare -3.340***(0.000) -3.196***(0.000) -3.381***(0.000) 
female -0.668***(0.019) -0.708***(0.020) -0.687***(0.020) 
incprimary 0.090(0.057) 0.049(0.059) 0.175**(0.066) 
primary 0.227***(0.049) 0.076(0.052) 0.296***(0.059) 
inctechnical 0.275***(0.055) 0.167**(0.057) 0.290***(0.066) 
technical 0.763***(0.046) 0.523***(0.048) 0.809***(0.057) 
incsecondary 0.432***(0.056) 0.240***(0.059) 0.420***(0.067) 
secondary 0.877***(0.046) 0.660***(0.048) 0.877***(0.056) 
someuniv 0.750***(0.051) 0.558***(0.053) 0.670***(0.062) 
university 1.010***(0.046) 0.820***(0.049) 1.068***(0.057) 
nochild -0.114(0.034) -0.177**(0.035) -0.093(0.036) 
widowed 0.082(0.057) 0.124*(0.060) 0.164***(0.062) 
separated 0.049(0.071) 0.031(0.077) 0.008(0.079) 
divorced 0.143***(0.055) 0.128***(0.057) 0.161***(0.059) 
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cohabite 0.127**(0.044) 0.133**(0.045) 0.159***(0.048) 
married 0.357***(0.037) 0.380***(0.038) 0.409***(0.039) 
fhealth 0.172**(0.044) 0.123(0.045) 0.124(0.047) 
ghealth 0.410***(0.043) 0.280***(0.044) 0.319***(0.046) 
vghealth 0.461***(0.045) 0.255***(0.047) 0.248***(0.049) 
trust 0.161***(0.020) 0.037(0.021) 0.046(0.023) 
fatalism -0.249***(0.004) -0.247***(0.005) -0.276***(0.005) 
creativityD2 -0.173***(0.025) -0.209***(0.026) -0.218***(0.027) 
creativityD3 -0.254***(0.027) -0.296***(0.028) -0.257***(0.029) 
creativityD4 -0.269***(0.034) -0.301***(0.035) -0.304***(0.038) 
creativityD5 -0.304***(0.039) -0.314***(0.040) -0.325***(0.042) 
creativityD6 -0.253***(0.068) -0.240***(0.068) -0.244***(0.071) 
riskD2 -0.182***(0.038) -0.215***(0.040) -0.181***(0.041) 
riskD3 -0.169***(0.037) -0.252***(0.039) -0.184***(0.041) 
riskD4 -0.154**(0.037) -0.227***(0.039) -0.194***(0.041) 
riskD5 -0.177**(0.036) -0.272***(0.038) -0.271***(0.040) 
riskD6 -0.239***(0.039) -0.302***(0.041) -0.295***(0.043) 
legal - 0.831***(0.011) -0.294(0.040) 
labflex - -0.106**(0.006) -0.253*(0.025) 
busflex - -0.281***(0.013) 0.245(0.043) 
Country fixed 
effects 
NO NO YES 
N 68379 61880 56926 
pseudo R2 0.075 0.080 0.112 
Standardized beta coefficients; White Robust standard errors in parentheses; * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
Fatalism has been recoded such that an increase in the variable indicates an increase in fatalistic tendencies 
 
3.2. Culture, institutions and opportunity perception 
The first step in the entrepreneurial process is the discovery/recognition of business 
opportunity. The estimation of the impact of fatalism and institutions on opportunity 
perception do not provide surprising results ( 
Table 4). In particular, in  
Table 4 the dependent variable is a dummy (named opport), equal  to one when an 
individual (entrepreneur or not) has declared  that good opportunities for starting a 
business would exist in the area where they lived in the 6 months following the survey. We 
regress  opport on a set of individual controls, the above depicted institutional variables, 
and our indicator of fatalism.  
As we expected, fatalism exerts a negative impact on opportunity perception. Of course, 
more articulated is the evidence on institutions. The better the quality of the legal system, 
the less corruption is widespread,  the less administrative requirements are burdensome, 
the more standards on product quality are stringent, the greater becomes the probability of 
seeing business opportunities. As before,  surprisingly, opportunity perception is 
negatively correlated with labor-market flexibility.  
 
Table 4: Entrepreneurial opportunity perception 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 opport opport opport 
Age 0.127***(0.001) 0.166***(0.001) 0.174***(0.001) 
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Agesquare -0.251***(0.000) -0.282***(0.000) -0.292***(0.000) 
    
Male 0.209***(0.005) 0.209***(0.005) 0.210***(0.005) 
    
educD2 0.161***(0.053) 0.192***(0.053) 0.218***(0.053) 
    
educD3 0.215***(0.053) 0.270***(0.053) 0.293***(0.053) 
    
educD4 0.238***(0.053) 0.295***(0.053) 0.317***(0.053) 
    
educD5 0.309***(0.053) 0.322***(0.053) 0.343***(0.054) 
    
Fatalism -0.297***(0.008) -0.484***(0.053) -0.426***(0.048) 
    
Oecd -0.211***(0.006) 0.131***(0.027) 0.199***(0.056) 
    
Legal - - 
 
0.058**(0.009) 
Labflex  
 
- 
 
-0.302***(0.008) 
administr  
 
- 
 
0.136***(0.007) 
Bureau  
 
- 
 
0.065***(0.003) 
Starting  
 
- 
 
-0.136***(0.007) 
Bribe  
 
- 
 
0.035*(0.007) 
Country fixed 
effects 
NO 
 
YES 
 
YES 
 
Year fixed 
effects 
NO YES YES 
N 449836 449836 446602 
pseudo R2 0.021 0.050 0.051 
Standardized beta coefficients; Robust Standard errors in parentheses; * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
Despite mainstream economics considers labour market regulation as a barrier  to 
entrepreneurial activity, some authors (e.g. Agell, 1999) sustain that labour market rigidity 
can stimulate workers’ investment in education and training by providing them with 
insurance against (ex ante) wage risk, and can promote workers’ willingness to share their 
knowledge with colleagues and the firm because they will not have to worry of being 
dismissed due to the implementation of the resulting process innovations. Therefore, this 
increase in the level of human capital and of innovation may improve the entrepreneurial 
opportunities perception, thereby compensating for the costs imposed by labour market 
rigidity26. 
Another surprising result is that relative to start-up cost. In particular, lower start-up costs 
do not seem to favor opportunity perception. According to Guiso and Schivardi (2011), low 
start up costs may induce also low ability individuals to become entrepreneurs, thus 
lowering both  the average level of TFP and the average level of managerial ability. Then, 
by lowering these barriers one may favor the entry of low ability entrepreneurs who are 
mainly driven by necessity rather than opportunity motivations. As a preliminary 
empirical support to this explanation,  we will show in the next paragraph that low start-up 
                                               
26 See De Bruin and Ferrante (2011) 
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costs are positively related to the probability of becoming a necessity entrepreneur (but not 
to the probability of being an opportunity driven entrepreneur).  
Finally, education seems to enhance entrepreneurship by exerting a positive and linear 
effect on the probability of seeing business opportunities. 
 
3.3. Necessity vs. opportunity entrepreneurship 
The distinction between necessity and opportunity entrepreneurship is fundamental to 
characterize the role of culture and institutions in entrepreneurial selection and 
performance.  To accomplish this end, we need to use a more refined data source on 
entrepreneurial motivation. The Global Entrepreneurship Monitor (GEM) data allows  to 
identify more narrowly entrepreneurs than WVS data. Furthermore it allows to distinguish 
between opportunity and necessity driven entrepreneurs. The former are those who have 
declared of being driven by opportunity in their occupational choice rather than by lack of 
alternatives, and who indicate that the main driver for being involved in entrepreneurship 
is being independent or to increase income (as opposed to just maintain income). The 
latter are those who are involved in entrepreneurship because they had no other chances. 
We created two dummy variables named oppentr and necentr for each type of 
entrepreneur and we use them as alternative dependent variable in the estimation of 
equation 1.  As a further test of the effect of  fatalism on the process of opportunity 
perception,  we included the explanatory variable opport, and  its interaction  with 
fatalism (fat_opp). We run 7 probit regressions and we included  the role of institutions 
only in regressions 5 to 7; we focus our comments on regression 5 and 7. 
Our results offer interesting insights on the different impacts of culture and institutions on 
the two types of entrepreneurship. First, education plays a positive role only for 
opportunity-driven entrepreneurship.  This may explain our previous results and why the 
international empirical evidence on the role of education in entrepreneurship is not very 
neat.  Fatalism exerts and adverse impact on both types of entrepreneurship but 
opportunity driven-entrepreneurship is more responsive to it.  This differential impact is 
also captured by the interaction dummy which is statistically significant and negatively 
signed only for opportunity entrepreneurship.  
As regards institutions, we find that labor market flexibility impacts adversely on both 
types of entrepreneurship, thus confirming our previous result. For what regards the 
negative effect of labour market flexibility on opportunity driven entrepreneurship, it may 
be explained with the redistributive effect, from skilled  to unskilled workers, of labour 
rigidity (Boeri et al. 2004): the latter may induce high ability individuals whose career 
aspirations are frustrated to “escape” from a compressed wage structure by opting for 
entrepreneurship.  
For what regards the explanation of the relation between flexibility and necessity 
entrepreneurship, we believe that it is reasonable to expect that,  in a rigid labour market, 
the “outsiders” may be pushed to entrepreneurship because of the long term 
unemployment tenure that this system implies.  This effect can be magnified the less 
generous is the system of unemployment benefits  (see Koellinger and Minniti, 2009). 
Surprisingly, the variable adminstr exerts a positive impact on opportunity 
entrepreneurship and it is not significant for necessity driven entrepreneurship. 
Conversely, the variable bureau is highly significant and negatively signed for necessity 
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entrepreneurship and significant at 10% and positively signed for opportunity 
entrepreneurship. Finally, the variable starting  is highly significant and negatively signed 
for opportunity entrepreneurship and significant at 10% and positively signed for 
opportunity entrepreneurship. 
 On the whole these results depict a complex and non conventional picture of the 
role of institutions in entrepreneurship and they provide some general indications on how 
to design good institutions, i.e. institutions sustaining quality entrepreneurship. The main 
results of the effect of institutions on opportunity perception, opportunity 
entrepreneurship and necessity entrepreneurship are summarized in Table 6. 
 
 
Table 5: Culture and institutions: opportunity vs. necessity entrepreneurship. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 teayyopp teayyopp Teayyopp teayyopp teayyopp teayyopp teayynec 
Age 3.128*** 
(0.002) 
2.768*** 
(0.003) 
3.313*** 
(0.003) 
2.910*** 
(0.003) 
2.910*** 
(0.003) 
3.317*** 
(0.003) 
4.997*** 
(0.003) 
Agesquare -3.599*** 
(0.000) 
-3.120*** 
(0.000) 
-3.748*** 
(0.000) 
-3.236*** 
(0.000) 
-3.236*** 
(0.000) 
-3.752*** 
(0.000) 
-5.158*** 
(0.000) 
Male 0.693*** 
(0.007) 
0.545*** 
(0.008) 
0.714*** 
(0.007) 
0.562*** 
(0.008) 
0.561*** 
(0.008) 
0.713*** 
(0.007) 
0.539*** 
(0.012) 
educD2 0.106 
(0.089) 
0.120 
(0.097) 
0.321* 
(0.091) 
0.154 
(0.101) 
0.198 
(0.101) 
0.357** 
(0.091) 
-0.090 
(0.118) 
educD3 0.269 
(0.089) 
0.292* 
(0.097) 
0.577*** 
(0.091) 
0.369** 
(0.101) 
0.409** 
(0.101) 
0.611*** 
(0.091) 
-0.190 
(0.119) 
educD4 0.429*** 
(0.089) 
0.415*** 
(0.097) 
0.620*** 
(0.091) 
0.406*** 
(0.101) 
0.443*** 
(0.101) 
0.651*** 
(0.091) 
-0.360 
(0.119) 
educD5 0.480*** 
(0.089) 
0.464*** 
(0.097) 
0.693*** 
(0.091) 
0.482*** 
(0.101) 
0.515*** 
(0.101) 
0.722*** 
(0.091) 
-0.417 
(0.120) 
fatalism4 -0.453*** 
(0.010) 
-0.215*** 
(0.016) 
-0.822*** 
(0.075) 
-0.767*** 
(0.089) 
-0.882*** 
(0.081) 
-1.273*** 
(0.068) 
-0.683*** 
(0.111) 
Oecd -0.605*** 
(0.008) 
-0.483*** 
(0.009) 
0.411*** 
(0.033) 
0.447*** 
(0.040) 
0.506*** 
(0.088) 
0.609*** 
(0.076) 
-0.095 
(0.127) 
Opport - 
 
0.887*** 
(0.009) 
- 
 
0.833*** 
(0.010) 
0.829*** 
(0.010) 
- 
 
0.851*** 
(0.014) 
fat_opp - 
 
-0.050*** 
(0.024) 
- 
 
-0.105*** 
(0.028) 
-0.110*** 
(0.029) 
- 
 
-0.020 
(0.043) 
Legal - 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
0.012 
(0.015) 
-0.022 
(0.012) 
-0.088 
(0.022) 
Labflex - 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
-0.283*** 
(0.012) 
-0.438*** 
(0.011) 
-0.885*** 
(0.016) 
administr - 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
0.164*** 
(0.011) 
0.196*** 
(0.010) 
-0.129 
(0.017) 
Bureau - 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
0.069* 
(0.005) 
0.054 
(0.004) 
-0.431*** 
(0.008) 
Starting - 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
-0.207*** 
(0.011) 
-0.168*** 
(0.010) 
0.236* 
(0.015) 
Bribe - 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
0.068 
(0.010) 
-0.014 
(0.009) 
-0.163 
(0.016) 
        
Country 
fixed effects 
NO 
 
NO 
 
YES 
 
YES 
 
YES YES YES 
        
Year fixed 
effects 
NO NO YES YES YES YES YES 
        
N 624719 402476 624719 402476 399521 620131 379097 
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pseudo R2 0.045 0.076 0.070 0.104 0.104 0.071 0.134 
Standardized beta coefficients; White Robust Standard errors in parentheses 
Entrepreneurs are confronted with individuals who are not exerting entrepreneurial activity 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
 
 
 
Table 6: Institutions and entrepreneurship 
Type of Institution Effect on 
Opportunity 
perception 
Effect on 
Opportunity driven 
entrepreneurship 
Effect on Necessity 
driven 
entrepreneurship 
Labour market flexibility - - - 
Standards on product quality + + - 
Start-up barriers + + - 
Widespread of corruption - Not significant Not significant 
Security of property rights + Not significant Not significant 
Strictness of Administrative 
requirements 
- - Not significant 
 
 
 
4. Summary and conclusions 
A growing body of literature considers culture, institutions and their interaction as 
important determinants  of cross-country disparities in  income per capita (Guiso et. Al, 
2006; Tabellini, 2010; Barro and McCleary, 2003; Gorodnichenko and Roland, 2009, etc).  
Another strand of contributions argues that entrepreneurship is a key ingredient of 
economic growth and job creation. Notwithstanding, comparatively few research efforts 
have been devoted so far to the analysis of the joint role of culture and institutions in 
determining economic growth through entrepreneurship. This paper addresses the latter 
gap by focusing on the country-specific institutional and cultural factors driving the 
selection of active entrepreneurs, i.e. entrepreneurship. We provide strong empirical 
support to the idea that culture and institutions matter a lot for entrepreneurship. We 
show that occupational choices, business opportunity perception and the share of 
opportunity entrepreneurship are all affected by peoples’ fatalism and by the institutional 
setting of a country. 
One should expect that entrepreneurship matters for the macroeconomic 
performance of a country in the short and the long run. In the short run the quality of 
entrepreneurship is one of the main determinants of the resilience of the economic system 
to adverse macroeconomic shocks and of the capacity of the latter to recover from the 
latter shocks. In the long run, entrepreneurship is the most important driver of innovation 
and economic growth.   
A legitimate question is whether governments can and should affect the 
macroeconomic performance by determining the quality of entrepreneurship by choosing 
the appropriate  institutions and, eventually, by shaping people’s cultural beliefs. Since 
governments’ action affects both institutions and people’s culture anyway, we believe that 
policies aiming to improve the quality of entrepreneurship are a legitimate and efficient 
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means to improve a society’s well being. The quality of entrepreneurship should be 
measured with the same criteria adopted to assess the quality of R&D investments. 
Innovation is based on experimentation, i.e. trial & error: to improve its productivity one 
should minimize the number of trials and errors necessary to achieve a given R&D output. 
This can be pursued by selecting the most promising research areas and the best 
researchers. Building on Baumol (1990), the general stance is that institutions should 
generate business opportunities of good quality and incentive systems leading to the 
selection of  good entrepreneurs, i.e. institutions should favor entrepreneurial ventures of 
good quality. But which institutions can achieve these goals and how can governments 
identify the good entrepreneurial ventures?  
Figure 4 and  in Figure 5, show the 2005 real GDP growth rate for 22 developed 
countries plotted against the percentage of  the workforce (those who are between 18 and 
64 year old) who is involved in opportunity driven early stage entrepreneurship 
(TEAOPP05), and the percentage of the workforce who is involved in necessity driven early 
stage entrepreneurship, respectively (TEANEC05).27 The figures  and the estimated 
correlation coefficients show that the GDP growth rate is positively and significantly 
correlated with the TEAOPP05 but not with TEANEC05. Of course, this is just prima facie 
evidence suggesting that governments should implement institutions favouring  
opportunity driven entrepreneurship28. On these premises, our paper provides some 
preliminary results and general insights. Surprisingly, labor market rigidities should not be 
the main concern of governments in that they are not the main barrier to quality 
entrepreneurship. Conversely high administrative burdens and poor product quality 
standards seem to discourage opportunity driven entrepreneurship. Our results are 
consistent with idea that too much entry of firms is not necessarily a good thing for 
employment and growth and that institutions should be designed, rather than for 
maximizing the entry of new firms, to produce a virtuous entrepreneurial selection (Shane, 
2009). For instance, entry barriers motivated by the pursuit of social goals (e.g. 
environmental protection, public safety and health), if legally enforced, may discourage 
entry of low ability entrepreneurs, characterized by high failures rates, without affecting 
the others or motivating them to enter because of the improved quality of the 
entrepreneurial and legal environment. To this respect, a high level of regulation 
                                               
27 The data sources for calculating  the real gdp growth rate are World Bank World Development Indicators, 
International Financial Statistics of the IMF.  
28  These are only correlations. We are not claiming a casual relation between the two variables. 
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associated to a low degree of its enforcement, i.e. a combination leading to a lot of firms 
entry and large shadow economies (Klapper, 2006), is one of the worse world.  
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Figure 5 
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As culture is concerned, our results on the positive impact of education on 
opportunity entrepreneurship are consistent with recent empirical research showing that 
in high income countries opportunity perception has a significant positive association with 
higher education (Levie and Autio 2008).  The link between education and opportunity 
driven entrepreneurship is twofold: it provides peoples with the skills to recognize and 
exploit opportunities and it reduces people’s fatalistic tendencies. On these grounds, in 
addition to increase general educational attainment in countries lagging behind, one can 
envisage two main ways to improve the quality in entrepreneurial selection. The first 
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consists of designing institutions providing incentives to allocate a larger share of a 
society’s investment in education to entrepreneurial activities (De Bruin and Ferrante, 
2011). This can be achieved mainly through measures leading to increase the expected 
returns, adjusted for risk, of human capital allocated to entrepreneurship, e.g. by 
increasing the returns to education in entrepreneurial activities. The second is support for 
the generation of entrepreneurial human capital through formal education and training, in 
particular, in those areas and industries where the nature of the process of opportunity 
recognition and exploitation yields higher social returns, is more complex and requires a 
large set of diverse skills, e.g. research intensive science and technology industries and the 
creative industries. As Schultz (1990: 98) points out, “The comparative advantage of 
schooling rises relative to that of learning from experience as technology becomes more 
complex and as a consequence of increases in specialization.”  
In relation to entrepreneurial education, its design should take account that a 
consistent part of entrepreneurial human capital is made up of those cognitive and non-
cognitive traits acquired early in life and there is evidence that the technology of skills 
formation is characterized by strong irreversibility and complementarities (Cuhna and 
Heckman 2007). Therefore, cost-effective entrepreneurial education should start early in 
life and possibly should proceed into tertiary education to develop a wide set of general 
and specific skills (Lazear 2005) necessary in the different entrepreneurial ventures e.g., 
scientific or cultural entrepreneurship (OECD 2005: 25).  
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Appendix I 
 
Definition of the variables (Table 3) 
Education: We created dummy variables for each of the possible levels reported on the following WVS 
question: What is the highest educational level that you have attained? [NOTE: if respondent indicates to be 
a student, code highest level s/he expects to complete]: (1) No formal education. (2) Incomplete primary 
school, (3) Complete primary school, (4) Incomplete secondary school: technical/vocational type, (5) 
Complete secondary school: technical/vocational type, (6) Incomplete secondary: university-preparatory 
type, (7) Complete secondary: university-preparatory type, (8) Some university-level education, without 
degree, (9) University-level education. The reference category is no formal education.  The associated 
dummy variables are named respectively: noeduc, incprimary, primary, inctechnical, technical 
incsecondary, secondary, someuniv, university. The reference category is noeduc. 
Age: respondent’s age in our analysis.  
Agesquare: The square of age  
Female: a dummy variable equal to one if the respondent’s sex was female.  
Marital status: It has been inserted by creating an indicator for each status: single, cohabiting, married, 
separated, divorced and widowed. Single is the reference category.  
Nochild: Number of children of the respondent.  
Health status: We created an indicator equal to one for each  self-perceived state of health: poor health, 
fair health, goodhealth, very good health.  These variables were respectively named, phealth, fhealth, ghealth, 
vghealth. phealth is the reference category. 
 
Definition of the variables (Table 4,5,6) 
Age : respondent’s age in our analysis.  
Agesquare: The square of age  
Male: a dummy variable equal to one if the respondent’s sex was male.  
Education: We created a dummy variable for each of the following educational level: None, Some 
Secondary School, Secondary degree, Post Secondary, Graduated. The associated dummy names are EducD1, 
EducD2, EducD3, EducD4,EducD5, respectively. The reference category is EducD1. 
 
Table 7: GEM descriptive statistics 
country Teaopp Teanec pport Fatalism legal labflex administr bureau starting bribe 
Argentina 0.079 0.041 0.429 -0.496 3.964 5.250 2.227 5.862 7.982 4.560 
Australia 0.069 0.013 0.411 -0.478 8.870 7.634 3.615 5.571 9.560 8.942 
Bosnia&H. 0.037 0.033 0.475 0.300 3.500 5.400 2.600 6.700 7.800 3.200 
Brazil 0.065 0.055 0.429 -0.112 4.900 4.122 1.878 4.889 6.356 5.589 
Canada 0.055 0.011 0.397 -0.416 8.405 7.987 3.911 5.744 9.617 8.375 
Chile 0.080 0.039 0.421 -0.094 6.857 6.942 4.356 4.699 9.043 7.756 
China 0.083 0.058 0.334 -0.152 5.757 4.961 4.329 3.895 7.056 5.740 
Colombia 0.126 0.092 0.639 -0.520 4.467 5.467 2.836 4.733 8.798 4.866 
Czech Rep. 0.044 0.018 0.265 0.253 6.200 7.700 2.300 2.600 9.200 6.200 
Egypt 0.106 0.024 0.424 0.398 5.400 5.000 3.600 5.800 9.600 4.900 
Finland 0.036 0.005 0.503 -0.079 9.062 4.788 5.875 5.473 9.213 9.400 
France 0.022 0.007 0.178 0.077 7.424 5.400 2.345 4.924 8.860 7.897 
Germany 0.035 0.011 0.226 0.015 8.690 3.494 3.425 5.470 8.227 8.693 
HongKong 0.028 0.012 0.355 0.129 7.579 9.324 6.600 5.257 9.600 8.575 
India 0.075 0.037 0.493 0.269 5.928 6.944 2.758 4.572 6.362 4.724 
Indonesia 0.165 0.029 0.455 -0.281 3.900 5.200 4.800 4.600 5.700 4.100 
Iran 0.060 0.028 0.352 -0.198 6.100 4.800 . . 9.700 . 
Italy 0.028 0.005 0.320 0.282 6.216 5.564 1.895 5.809 8.794 6.368 
Japan 0.019 0.006 0.092 0.612 7.561 8.120 4.010 5.373 8.417 8.213 
Jordan 0.151 0.029 0.396 -0.148 6.500 8.400 4.700 2.900 5.300 7.300 
Korea 0.066 0.040 0.136 -0.174 6.466 4.267 3.368 5.536 7.765 6.401 
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Latvia 0.043 0.010 0.361 0.777 6.824 6.704 3.674 4.200 9.400 5.819 
Macedonia 0.059 0.059 0.501 0.284 5.100 8.000 3.800 5.600 9.800 5.300 
Malaysia 0.105 0.006 0.505 -0.159 6.900 7.700 6.000 2.800 9.000 7.000 
Mexico 0.074 0.024 0.413 -0.486 4.962 5.664 2.475 4.514 7.720 5.405 
Netherl. 0.030 0.003 0.396 0.212 8.729 6.495 3.297 4.245 9.125 8.686 
N. Zealand 0.100 0.016 0.519 -0.687 8.934 7.971 3.431 6.827 9.138 9.445 
Norway 0.051 0.004 0.451 -0.409 8.737 4.820 4.088 5.456 9.074 8.964 
Peru 0.224 0.097 0.640 -0.303 4.953 6.729 2.177 5.176 7.430 5.623 
Philippin.  0.114 0.099 0.610 -0.263 4.900 5.900 2.500 5.500 7.800 4.000 
Poland 0.038 0.025 0.175 0.068 5.833 5.700 2.733 6.167 6.834 5.233 
P. Rico 0.022 0.004 0.369 -0.819 . . . . . . 
Romania 0.016 0.008 0.258 0.007 5.900 6.700 3.637 5.152 9.600 5.756 
Russia 0.025 0.007 0.195 0.173 5.032 5.704 2.258 4.633 7.744 4.604 
Serbia 0.030 0.024 0.502 0.004 4.798 5.896 1.704 5.798 9.353 4.700 
Slovenia 0.036 0.006 0.376 -0.405 6.139 5.321 3.622 4.323 8.384 7.622 
S. Africa 0.031 0.015 0.239 0.130 6.585 6.008 3.260 4.907 8.606 6.811 
Spain 0.052 0.009 0.335 -0.081 6.646 5.278 3.293 4.321 8.184 7.243 
Sweden 0.027 0.003 0.410 -0.659 8.277 5.079 4.104 7.883 9.209 8.887 
Switzerl. 0.049 0.008 0.363 -0.306 8.636 7.638 5.247 5.492 9.247 8.917 
Taiwan 0.031 0.006 0.144 -0.454 6.400 4.500 5.200 6.000 7.700 8.000 
Thailand 0.114 0.048 0.271 -0.104 6.216 7.228 4.410 3.380 8.900 5.775 
Turkey 0.030 0.019 0.392 0.485 5.868 4.133 3.100 4.732 9.567 5.702 
Uganda 0.154 0.133 0.708 -0.065 4.302 8.700 3.870 4.828 7.866 4.068 
UK 0.035 0.006 0.335 -0.419 8.522 8.255 3.556 4.277 9.540 8.423 
USA 0.070 0.010 0.327 -0.493 7.867 9.094 3.483 5.131 9.245 6.921 
Uruguay 0.060 0.031 0.479 -0.419 5.567 6.300 3.533 4.666 7.699 7.266 
Venezuela 0.142 0.088 0.572 -0.741 2.451 3.069 1.242 4.454 6.365 4.043 
 
 
 
Table  8: Ordered probit of Fatalism 
 Ordered probit 
 fatalism 
age 0.041***(0.001) 
agesquare -0.051***(0.000) 
incomeD2 0.001(0.013) 
incomeD3 -0.006***(0.013) 
incomeD4 -0.012***(0.013) 
incomeD5 -0.017***(0.013) 
incomeD6 -0.023***(0.013) 
incomeD7 -0.026***(0.014) 
incomeD8 -0.027***(0.015) 
incomeD9 -0.022***(0.017) 
incomeD10 -0.025***(0.019) 
secondary -0.011***(0.009) 
secnottec -0.014***(0.009) 
university -0.018***(0.009) 
goodhealth -0.079***(0.012) 
fairhealth -0.041***(0.013) 
divorced -0.000(0.013) 
widowed 0.003***(0.014) 
single -0.002*(0.009) 
parttime 0.002*(0.011) 
selfemployed -0.005***(0.010) 
retired 0.002(0.012) 
housewife 0.010***(0.009) 
student 0.006***(0.013) 
unemployed 0.009***(0.011) 
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otherjob 0.005***(0.022) 
Country fixed effects YES 
Wave fixed effects YES 
N 180543 
pseudo R2 0.031 
Standardized beta coefficients; White Robust Standard errors in parentheses 
The variable Fatalism has been recoded so that an increase in the variable indicates an increase in level of fatalistic 
tendencies 
*
 p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
 
Table 9: Country level indicator of fatalism 
Argentina -0.49642 New Zealand -0.68711 
Australia -0.47817 Norway -0.40858 
Bosnia  0.299948 Peru -0.30297 
Brazil -0.11207 Philippines -0.26297 
Canada -0.41616 Poland 0.068479 
Chile -0.09354 Puerto Rico -0.81888 
China -0.15177 Romania 0.007386 
Colombia -0.52013 Russia 0.173029 
Czech Republic 0.253037 Serbia 0.003879 
Egypt 0.398117 Slovenia -0.40495 
Finland -0.07901 S.Africa 0.129944 
France 0.077374 Spain -0.08076 
Germany 0.014945 Sweden -0.65914 
Hong Kong 0.129089 Switzerland -0.30609 
India 0.268809 Taiwan -0.45414 
Indonesia -0.28073 Thailand -0.10375 
Iran -0.19843 Turkey 0.485087 
Italy 0.282225 Uganda -0.06472 
Japan 0.611996 UK -0.41891 
Jordan -0.14769 USA -0.49289 
Korea -0.17353 Uruguay -0.41902 
Latvia 0.776772 Venezuela -0.74091 
Macedonia 0.284122   
Malaysia -0.15928   
Mexico -0.48604   
Netherlands 0.21194   
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Appendix II 
 
Here, we present a simplified version of the model proposed by Ruiu (2012) to illustrate 
the main predictions about the effect of fatalism on the entrepreneurial choice. Consider a 
closed economy  composed by workforce of  risk neutral individuals of size normalized to 
unity. In this economy the individuals have two options: to become entrepreneurs or to 
work for others. The production function combine one manager/owner with labour  to 
produce Y homogeneous units of output sold at unit price. The wage rate is given by w.  
The individuals are heterogeneous with respect to their ability as workers, b. Let assume 
that  is distributed among the population according to a distribution with cdf 
given by  F(b) with . 
Assume that b is perfectly observable and that a worker endowed with a level of ability 
equal to b is able to offer b units of efficiency labor.  Then the return of being an employee 
for the i-th individual is  W = wbi. The production function is given by: 
 
 
 
Where α  is the level the entrepreneurial ability and  n are efficiency units of labour. Now, 
suppose that the individuals don’t know ex-ante  their level of entrepreneurial ability. We 
indicate  with s  an exogenous culturally determined level of fatalism of the workforce. In 
particular  if s=1,  the individuals are extremely fatalistic while s=0 indicates the opposite  
situation.  
If  s=1, the individual believes that entrepreneurial success is determined by the Fate. Since 
Fate is inscrutable, fatalistic individuals attach the same probability to each possible event 
included in the interval  Therefore, fatalistic individuals believe that level of 
entrepreneurial ability is distributed according to    with   such that the 
expected value of  α,  E(α)>0 but very small.   
If   instead s=0, the individuals believe that the level of the entrepreneurial ability is a 
deterministic function  α= g(b) of their level of ability b. Assume that g(0)=0, and g’>0, 
g’’>0.  Hence, if an individual is not fatalistic he believes that luck doesn’t play a role in 
determining the success of an entrepreneur.   
A fatalistic  individual (s=1) with a level of ability equal to b will become entrepreneur if: 
 
 
 
A  non fatalistic (s=0) individual with a level of ability equal to b will become entrepreneur 
if: 
 
 
In the latter case,  solving the maximization problem gives the optimal labour demand29: 
                                               
29 It is straightforward to derive the solution also for the fatalistic entrepreneur.  
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Note that the labour demand is decreasing in w and increasing in b.  
How does profits react to an increase in b? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Then using the fact that n(b,w) satisfies the f.o.c. of the maximization problem, i.e. 
, we have: 
 
 
 
from which  it is easy to show that also     
Now, we graphically show the solution to the occupational choice problem of the generic 
individuals endowed with a level of ability equal to b: 
 
 
 
 
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
γ γ
γ γ
pi γ
γ
−
−
∂
= + − =
∂
 = + − 
1
1
'( ) ( , ) ( , ) ' , ' ,
'( ) ( , ) ' , ( , )
g b n b w g b n b w n b w wn b w
b
g b n b w n b w g b n b w w
36 
 
b
Wage, Profit
 
 
On the vertical axis we plot the value of being a worker (represented the black curve which 
starts in the origin) and the value of being an entrepreneur corresponding to different 
levels of s.  
The horizontal curve represents the value of being an entrepreneur of an extremely 
fatalistic individual. In this case, the individual will opt for entrepreneurship only when his 
level of ability as worker is extremely low, i.e. when b<bL. Let’s indicate these individuals 
as necessity driven entrepreneurs. 
The red curve indicates the value of being an entrepreneur when s=0. In this case only high 
ability individuals with b>bH  will become entrepreneurs. Let’s  indicate these individuals 
as opportunity driven entrepreneurs. 
The blue curve indicates the value of being an entrepreneur for intermediate levels of 
fatalism (0<s<1).  For these individuals the expected level of entrepreneurial ability is 
given by sE(α) + (1-s)g(b). With respect to the case of s=0, the curve is translated upward 
because a higher number of individuals believe that Fate plays a role in determining 
entrepreneurial ability. At the same time the blue curve is flatter than the red curve 
because individuals are less confident about the role of their ability, b,  in determining 
entrepreneurial success.  
When 0<s<1 both necessity and opportunity driven entrepreneurs are present in the 
market. In particular, only those who are endowed with a level of ability below/above  
bLL/bHH will become necessity driven/opportunity driven entrepreneurs.  However note 
that the number of high ability entrepreneurs is much lower than in the former case.  
To close the model, note that the economy is in equilibrium when  w is such that the total 
labour demand is equal to the total labour offer. Considering  for simplicity  the case where 
s =1  (similar arguments apply to the other cases) :  
          E(α) 
sE(α)  
 
 
bH bHH bLL  bL 
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Using the Leibniz’s rule the for the differentiation of L
D 
 we have: 
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Therefore the continuity of L
s 
 and L
D 
 ensures that a unique w* exists.
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